Which electorates receive targeted funding, and does targeted funding swing votes? To answer these questions, I focus on four discretionary programs introduced by the Together, these programs totalled well over $1 billion dollars. Controlling for relevant demographic characteristics of the electorate, I find that those electorates held by the governing Liberal-National Coalition (particularly those held by the National Party) received a larger share of discretionary funding, and a larger number of program grants.
Introduction
Pork barrel politics -the practice of targeting expenditure to particular districts based on political considerations -has been in existence for at least two centuries. 1 In the United
States, where the term was originally coined, over 15,000 projects per year are "earmarked" for particular districts (Flake 2006) . Variously sponsored by representatives on both sides of the politics, such projects are frequently added onto budget appropriations to accommodate constituents, campaign donors, or potential supporters.
While pork-barrelling has been extensively studied in the US, less research has been conducted on the phenomenon among parliamentary democracies, in which political parties typically exert more control over their legislators. When decision-making over local expenditure is more highly centralized, resources may be allocated differently than in a decentralized system.
Here, I focus on four multi-million dollar Australian programs that were allocated on a discretionary basis across federal electorates. As a parliamentary democracy with compulsory voting, Australia provides a useful testing-ground for theories about the partisan allocation of discretionary funding -both between government and opposition, and within the governing Coalition. It also provides an opportunity to explore the effect of additional spending on voting patterns in the subsequent election.
To preview my findings, I observe a strong partisan component to the expenditure decisions, with more generous funding and more program grants allocated to electorates held by the party in power. This result is robust to controlling for demographic characteristics of the electorate that might have affected the allocation of funding.
Estimating the effect of this expenditure on voting, I find targeted funding -particularly 1 Gordon (1993) argues that the construction of the Egyptian pyramids was a form of pork-barrelling, designed to keep peasants from rebelling. A more settled example is the US Bonus Bill 1817, a highway project introduced by then Congressman John Calhoun, but ultimately vetoed by President Madison. The Oxford English Dictionary dates the first use of the term 'pork barrel' to an article written in the Westminster Gazette in 1909.
roads funding -had a positive and statistically significant impact on the swing received by the governing Coalition in the 2004 election.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 outlines the details of the four funding programs and relevant electoral data. Section 4 estimates the extent to which funding decisions appear to have been skewed by political considerations. Section 5 estimates the effect of the funding on the results in the following election, and the final section concludes.
Research on Pork-Barrelling
The ability of governments to apportion local-level expenditure for partisan purposes has long been of interest to political scientists and economists. One of the key questions in this literature is whether politicians allocate resources primarily towards swing seats or core supporters. While Cox and McCubbins (1986) posited a model in which politicians are risk-averse, and therefore channel resources more generously towards their core supporters, Dixit and Londregan (1996) argued that in certain circumstances, politicians may prefer to spend money on swing voters.
Several studies have sought to determine whether a greater share of spending is directed towards core supporters or swing voters. Programs that seem to be more targeted towards core supporters include Canadian regional development grants (Milligan and Smart 2005) and New Deal funding in the US during the 1930s (Lindstädt 2005) . By contrast, those that appear to be more targeted towards swing voters include Canadian job training grants In the Australian context, two studies of a $60 million sports grants program in the early1990s concluded that the spending was directed in a partisan fashion, primarily towards swing voters (Gaunt 1999; Denemark 2000) . Similarly, an analysis of federal programs for the unemployed (Andrews, Fry and Jakee 2005) found that the program was skewed towards government-held marginal electorates.
In general, one should expect that in systems with weaker political parties and stronger individual members, pork-barrelling will tend to be directed towards core supporters. By contrast, when parties are stronger and individual members weaker, discretionary funding is more likely to be targeted towards electorates with a smaller vote margin. 3 As Denemark (2000, 898) has noted:
Unlike the sharp dichotomy between the interests of the individual and the party that fuels constituency activities in America, parliamentary parties in government confront a collective electoral imperative to assure the victory of their most vulnerable party colleagues in marginal seats. In short, the parliamentary gap between individual and collective interests is "virtually nonexistent" (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1984, 111) .
With some exceptions (eg. Milligan and Smart 2005) , the empirical literature across countries has tended to support this theoretical prediction.
How much does pork-barrelling matter at the ballot box? While some studies have observed little or no relationship between local expenditure and voteshare (Feldman and Jondrow 1984; Stein and Bickers 1994) , others have found that more spending raises the voteshare of the incumbent (Alvarez and Saving 1997b; Levitt and Snyder 1997) . Levitt and Snyder (1997) suggested that if spending levels are higher when the incumbent is weak, the coefficient on expenditure might be biased downwards, and instrument for 3 An additional factor in Australia is the existence of compulsory voting, which substantially reduces the risk that the governing party's core supporters will refuse to vote.
local spending using spending in the same state but outside the district. I discuss this possible bias in section 5.
The Programs and Electoral Data
In selecting programs, my focus is on Australian federal government programs that meet the following criteria:
(a) they are regional in nature, and allocated in a manner that allowed for some discretion by politicians; Four programs meet these three criteria: Roads to Recovery, Stronger Families and Communities, Sustainable Regions, and Regional Partnerships. In sections 3.1 to 3.4, I
discuss each of the programs, focusing on the aims of the programs, the dates when the funding was delivered, the funding criteria, the source of the funding data, and any publicly available cost-benefit analyses. Cost-benefit studies are relevant since a narrow definition of pork-barrelling requires not only that the allocation be based primarily on political considerations, but also that the program is "economically inefficient" (Lancaster and Patterson 1990) . Section 3.5 outlines the electoral and demographic variables.
Roads to Recovery
The Roads to Recovery program was announced in November 2000, and commenced in January 2001. It provides funding to local councils to undertake "the construction, upgrade or maintenance of roads". Overall, 46 percent of funding was devoted to reconstruction, rehabilitation or widening of existing roads, 26 percent to sealing or resealing, 7 percent to bridges and tunnels, and 6 percent to the construction of a new road. The remainder of the funding was devoted to smaller programs, including signage, street lighting and bicycle paths (DOTARS/ALGA 2003).
To prevent federal funding merely being substituted for state funding, a condition of receipt is that local councils are required to maintain their roads expenditure at the same level as in the 1998-99 to 2000-01 financial years. Another condition requires that each of the projects be signposted at both ends with a "Roads to Recovery" sign, acknowledging the financial assistance of the federal government (with each pair of signs costing $550, the total cost of this advertising across more than 8000 projects nationwide exceeds $4 million). The allocation mechanism is somewhat opaque, but according to the program's annual report (DOTARS 2004) , funding is allocated across states and territories according to "historical precedents, length of local roads and population". The report does not make clear precisely how funding is allocated across local areas.
In this analysis, I focus on $1. In 2004, the federal government commissioned a cost-benefit analysis of the programs.
This covered 80 projects, slightly less than 1 percent of the total number of Roads to
Recovery projects funded to that point. (It was not clear on what basis these projects were selected for inclusion in the analysis.) Based on data provided by councils, the analysis concluded that the average benefit-cost ratio of Roads to Recovery projects was 1.8.
However, the distribution was highly skewed. While some projects had benefit-cost ratios as high as 16, most were much lower. Fifty-five percent of projects had a benefit-cost ratio below 1, so for the median Roads to Recovery program, the costs outweighed the benefits. Only 20 percent of programs had a benefit-cost ratio exceeding 2. By contrast, the National Black Spot program, which operated over this period, refused to consider applications for any programs whose benefit-cost ratio was lower than 2 (DOTARS 2001a, Part 2.1)
Stronger Families and Communities
The Volunteer Small Equipment Grants were grants to "encourage and support volunteers by enabling local community organisations to purchase small equipment items to make the work of their volunteers easier, safer and more enjoyable" (FACS 2005a FACS (2005) stated that the grants were to be for amounts "up to $3000", one-quarter of the grants in the electoral breakdown were for amounts larger than $3000. 
Electoral and Demographic Variables
In both 
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Quantum of funding
To see the relationship between political considerations and funding decisions, Figure 1 charts the percentage of the two-party preferred vote received by the Coalition at the 2001 election against the amount of funding received under each of the programs. All four programs were more generous to Coalition-held seats (those to the right of the dashed line) than to those held by the non-government parties (those to the left of the dashed line). Among Coalition-held seats, it does not appear that more funding was devoted to marginal seats than safe seats. One point to note about all of the above results is that in all specifications in Panels A and B, the National Party coefficients are larger in magnitude than the Liberal Party coefficients. Since the National Party are the junior party in the federal Coalition, this is somewhat surprising, and suggests that the party's influence in obtaining targeted funding was disproportionate to its representation in the government. 
Number of grants
I now turn to looking at the relationship between partisanship and the number of grants delivered. The intuition for this approach is that, with quasi-rational voters, a politician may gain more political capital from being able to announce a larger number of grants.
Alternatively, more grants may allow a politician to target a larger number of interest groups within the electorate. Either scenario suggests the possibility that a politician may gain more political advantage from announcing ten separate grants of $50,000 than a single $500,000 grant. Since I do not have data on the number of Roads to Recovery programs per electorate, I focus in this section only on the other three programs.
Panel A of Table 3 Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Demographic controls are a quadratic in median family income for SF&C, and a quadratic in population density for SR and RP.
Swing Seats or Base?
An important question in the existing literature is whether targeted funding tends to be delivered more towards swing seats or safe seats. To test this, I restrict the analysis to Coalition seats, and regress the amount of funding on the Coalition's share of the vote in the 2001 election. 14 The results are presented in Table 4 . I find no evidence that any of the programs are significantly more targeted towards marginal seats. Indeed, Roads to 14 Non-government seats are excluded from this analysis on the basis that it is not clear whether targeted funding in non-government electorates would have led voters to reward the sitting member or the governing party. Assuming that voters always reward the governing party for targeted funding, the appropriate way to conduct the analysis would be to include all seats, and then regress the funding allocation for each program (or the number of grants) on |Coalition Voteshare-50%|. Such an exercise produces results that are qualitatively similar to those shown in Table 4 .
Recovery funding appears to have been more generous towards safer seats. I obtain similar results when the dependent variable is the number of grants instead of the total funding allocation.
Note that while the results in Table 4 do not show any strong patterns according to whether seats were safe or marginal, it would not be correct to say that funding was spread evenly across Coalition seats. As the results in Tables 2 and 3 demonstrated, seats held by the National Party, the junior partner in the Coalition, received significantly more funding than those held by the Liberal Party. 
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An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Funding on Elections
How do voters respond at the ballot box to targeted funding? To test this, I analyse the relationship between additional funding provided through the programs analysed above Since allocations of funding under these four programs might be positively correlated with one another, Table 6 presents results with all four programs included together. In the first column, I find that without any other controls, the coefficient on the Roads to Recovery program is positive (and significant at the 1 percent level), while Stronger Families and Communities is positive (and significant at the 10 percent level). Regional Partnerships funding is, surprisingly, negative (and significant at the 10 percent level).
Since the coefficient on the Regional Partnerships program was insignificant in Table 5 , it would be unwise to make much of this result.
Controlling for demographics and the Coalition's share of the vote in 2001, it is notable that the magnitude of the Roads to Recovery coefficient is very similar to that in Table 5 .
By contrast, the coefficient on the Stronger Families and Communities program is statistically insignificant in columns (2), (3) and (4). The coefficient on the Regional Partnerships program is statistically insignificant with only demographic controls (column 2), but negative and significant in columns (3) and (4). Do electorates that receive a larger number of grants have a larger swing towards the Coalition? In Table 7 , I show the relationship between the swing towards the Coalition and the number of grants, focusing on the three programs for which data are available. In However, when controls for both electorate demographics and Coalition voteshare in 
Conclusion
This program analyses the distribution of four programs that fall into the broad category of regional assistance programs. These types of programs account for a large (and in some cases, growing) share of government budgets. Regional assistance programs amount to over US$16 billion in the US, more than €30 billion in the European Union, and over $4 billion in Australia. In allocating these resources, there is therefore considerable potential for political considerations to take precedence over social and economic factors. I find no evidence that the grants were more generous to more marginal electorates (indeed, the Roads to Recovery program seems to have gone more to safe seats). To the extent that funding was targeted among Coalition seats, it appears to have been towards seats held by the smaller party in the Coalition, the National Party, and not towards swing seats. This is surprising, in light of the fact that earlier studies of pork-barrelling in 17 This figure is similar to Levitt and Snyder (1997) 
